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"ANOTHER THING NEEDFUL":
EXPLORING EMOTIONS IN LAW
THE PASSIONS OF LAW. Edited by Susan A. Bandes. 1
New York University Press. 1999. Pp. 367. $35.00.
Neal Feigenson 2

Law encounters emotion at every turn. Law deals with
crimes of passion, property disputes, and divorces that involve
fury, despair, and a dozen other feelings. Law is made and implemented by legislators, judges, and jurors who, being human,
react to the matters before them with sympathy, anger, or disgust, all of which may affect their judgments. And both legal decisions and the processes by which they are reached can provoke
strong emotional responses on the part of litigants and the community-recall the widespread outrage sparked by the verdict in
the first Rodney King trial.
The mere ubiquity of emotion in law need not persuade legal scholars and practitioners that the emotions are worth serious study. One might believe, in accord with most legal doctrine
and dominant traditions in philosophy and jurisprudence, that
emotional influence invariably produces inferior decisionmaking
and is simply to be avoided, or its effects contained, where possible. This pejorative view of emotion in judgment is illustrated
by Judge Richard Posner's remarks in his contribution to the
present volume:
The idea of emotion as a kind of cognitive shortcut explains
why jurors, like children, are more likely to make emotional
judgments than judges. The less experienced a person is at

I. Professor of Law, DePaul University.
2. Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law, and Research Affiliate,
Yale University Department of Psychology. The essay's title is taken from the title of
Chapter One in Book the Third of Charles Dickens's Hard Times (1845) and, as explained by Martha Nussbaum, one of the contributors to the present volume and perhaps
the leadmg proponent of studying the significance of emotion in legal judgment, refers to
the "intelligence and ineliminability" of emotion in human judgment. Martha Nussbaum, Emotions as Judgments of Value, 5 Yale J. Criticism 201,201 (1992).
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reasoning through a particular kind of problem, the more
likely that person is to "react emotionally," that is, to fall back
on a more primitive mode of reaching a conclusion, the emotional. . . . Emotions, like sex, are something that we have in
common with animals, who, having smaller cortexes than humans, rely more heavily than humans do on emotions to guide
their actions. 3

Those who would police the effects of emotions in law ought at
least to be curious about their actual workings, but that curiosity
may be dampened by a general disdain for emotion-driven
thinking. One might also believe that even if knowing more
about how emotions affect behavior and judgment could help
legislators and judges to craft better rules and decisions, no such
reliable and practical knowledge exists beyond what lawmakers'
"common sense" already tells them. Furthermore, one might
take the position that the emotional repercussions of legal processes and decisions on participants and the community are not
the law's concern.
To capture the attention and imagination of mainstream legal scholars and officials, then, a book about emotion in law
ought to explain why at least some emotions should be regarded
as desirable features of at least some kinds of legal judgments,
and how we should go about distinguishing desirable from undesirable emotional influences in various contexts. The book
should ground these discussions in the best empirical research
and theory on the emotions available in other fields. Like any
other interdisciplinary scholarship, it should also be attentive to
the controversies and the limits of the findings in those fields. 4
Ideally, the book would persuade readers that interdisciplinary
scholarship can guide practical thinking about the role that specific emotions play, and should play, in framing and deciding important legal problems.
3. Richard A. Posner, Emotion versus Emotionalism in Law, in Susan A. Bandes,
ed., The Passions of Law 311 (New York U. Press, 1999). As the title of his essay indicates, Posner is attempting to distinguish this sort of undesirable "emotionalism" from
what he later argues is the desirable use of certain emotions (indignation and empathy)
in judging. Id. at 322-24. Perhaps most interesting here is that by equating jurors with
children, and thence (via sex) with animals, in their emotionality, Posner deploys "emotion" in an all-too-familiar rhetorical fashion to support a hierarchy of who is best or least
fit to render legal judgments. The premises underlying his contentions do not stand up to
scrutiny: For instance, there is no basis for supposing that persons faced with an unfamiliar decisionmaking problem will fall back on emotional as opposed to non-emotional
cognitive shortcuts.
.
4. As pointed out in another review of the present volume. Laura E. Little, Negotiating the Tangle of Law and Emotion, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 974,980 (2001).
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The Passions of Law, edited by Susan Bandes, presents thirteen essays by outstanding contributors who investigate the extent to which particular emotions ought to affect law. 5 The contexts addressed range from the proper place (if any) of anger
and vengeance-by victim, judge, or community-in punishment, to whether popular disgust should be relevant to criminalizing a behavior or choosing a penalty for it, to the idea of romantic love underlying the Defense of Marriage Act, to the
importance of a judge's emotional traits to his or her decisionmaking. Collectively the authors deploy their considerable
learning from "philosophy, classics, psychology, religion, ethics,
law, and social thought" (to cite Bandes's own list on p. 7) to understand some of the myriad descriptive and normative issues
posed by the pervasiveness of emotion in law.
In its impressive variety of topics and approaches, The Passions of Law indeed "take[s] the conversation about emotion [in
law] far beyond easy platitudes about the desirability of compassion, mercy, and love or the dangers of vengeance and resentment." (pp. 14-15) The authors' insightful and intellectually
rigorous normative analyses should persuade even casual readers that the place of emotion in law deserves much closer study.
The use of empirical research on the emotions in psychology and
elsewhere to inform specific issues the editor and authors themselves raise, however, is less consistent, somewhat hampering the
collection from achieving the editor's laudable Legal Realist aim
of grounding law in (what we think we know about) reality. 6
The Passions of Law does not offer an overarching theory
of the emotions or their effects on legal decisionmaking. This is
as it should be, because no generally agreed-upon theory exists.
Bandes recognizes that emotion theory and research is immensely complex and that the role of emotions in behavior, including social judgments, is highly variable and contextdependent. (pp. 8, 13) The particularity of the essays is thus
well suited to the present state of psychological (and other)
knowledge about emotion. The better pieces manage to avoid
what Bandes identifies as the twin dangers of reductionism (ignoring the complexities and uncertainties in what other disciplines have learned about emotions) and paralysis (treating
5. The Passions of Law arose in part from a conference on the subject of law and
emotion held at the University of Chicago Law School in May, 1998.
6. Susan Bandes, Introduction, in Passions at 8 (cited in note 3) ("(a]t some point,
we need to take what we know (about emotions] ... and incorporate it into our decisionmaking processes").
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those complexities and uncertainties as grounds for rejecting
emotion theory and research as an aid to legal decision and policymaking). (p. 8) I will mention just a few examples of the authors' nuanced knowledge of other fields and their application of
that knowledge to specific legal issues.
Martha Nussbaum argues that disgust should be irrelevant
to law-contrary to current practice in a variety of contexts, constitutional and other. 7 For instance, the disgust of an average
member of the community is considered central to defining expression as obscene and thus unprotected by the First Amendment.8 Statutes allowing capital juries to impose the death penalty for crimes they believe to be "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible and inhuman" (or similar language), some of which
have been held to violate the Eighth Amendment, invite jurors
to factor their disgust into their sentencing decisions. 9 And the
disgust of a killer for his victim's homosexuality is sometimes
recognized as a mitigating factor in homicide. 10
Nussbaum first summarizes the psychology of disgust, pointing out that "[i]n all societies ... disgust expresses a refusal to
ingest and thus be contaminated by a potent reminder of one's
own mortality and animality," (p. 25) and that disgust often
works by means of "psychological contamination." We may be
disgusted by something not because it is offensive in itself but
because it has either been in contact with or is perceived to resemble a disgusting substance. (p. 28) Nussbaum argues that
due to these essential features," disgust as a type of emotion is
inherently unsuited to law. Law should reflect collective judgments based on the "public exchange of reasons," but feeling
7. Martha C. Nussbaum, 'Secret Sewers of Vice': Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in
Passions at 19-62 (cited in note 3).
8. Id at 39; see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (stating obscenity test).
9. Nussbaum, 'Secret Sewers of Vice' at 49-50 (cited in note 7); see, e.g., Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (holding that statute permitting death sentence if offense
"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman" violated Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
10. Nussbaum, 'Secret Sewers of Vice' at 35-38 (cited in note 7).
II. Cognitive emotion theorists (of whom Nussbaum is one) posit that each type of
emotion has a distinct "cognitive structure" which reflects the kind of appraisal of and
reaction to the world that that emotion (implicitly) represents. See, e.g., Andrew Ortony, Gerald L. Clore, and Allan Collins, The Cognitive Structure of Emotions (Cambridge U. Press, 1988). Similarly, psychologist Richard Lazarus calls each emotion's defining structure its "core relational theme." Richard Lazarus, Universal Antecedents of
the Emotions, in Paul Ekman and Richard J. Davidson, eds., The Nature of Emotion 163,
164 (Oxford U. Press, 1994) (defining the core relational theme of disgust, e.g., as
"[t]aking in or being too close to an indigestable [sic] object or idea (metaphorically
speaking)").

2001]

BOOK REVIEWS

449

disgust does not "provide[] the disgusted person with a set of
reasons that can be used for purposes of public persuasion."
(p. 27) One cannot formulate "publicly articulable reasons" to
persuade another to be disgusted by something that person is not
already disgusted by. (p. 27) In this respect disgust is unlike,
say, anger and indignation, which are based (in part) on the perception that one (or one's community) has been wronged. 12
"The reasons underlying a person's indignation can be false or
groundless," but often those reasons can at least be identified
and articulated; and "if they stand up to scrutiny, we can expect
our friends and fellow citizens to share them." (p. 26)
Might the experience of disgust nevertheless be valuable to
legal decisionmakers by providing a visceral signal that something is to be disvalued and hence avoided? 13 No, argues Nussbaum, because our occasional disgust reactions toward other
people are too likely to have been socially engineered by dominant groups to disparage and exclude disfavored groups: women,
Jews, homosexuals, persons of color. 14 For the law to recognize
a jury's disgust at an allegedly obscene object or a criminal's disgust at his homosexual victim (Nussbaum analyzes specific cases
of each in detail) is to validate misogynistic or homophobic fears
of bodily contamination- not justifications that belong in a democratic society committed to equality. (pp. 35-42) Moreover,
for the law to permit a jury to take its disgust (as opposed to its
anger or even outrage) at a homicide into account when
determining how severely to punish the offender is to encourage
the perception of criminal defendants as "heinous monsters
more or less outside the boundaries of our moral universe,"
(p. 50) an attitude that fosters ever more extreme reactions to
crime and protects us from having to consider whether we
ourselves might not do awful things were our luck and
circumstances different. (pp. 51-52)

12. Nussbaum, 'Secret Sewers of Vice' at 26 (cited in note 7); see also Lazarus, Uni·
versa[ Antecedents at 164 (cited in note 11) (defining core relational theme of anger as
"[a) demeaning offense against me and mine").
13. See, e.g., Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the
Human Brain 165-201 (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1994) (defining emotions as "somatic markers" that help us to choose among alternative courses of action).
14. Nussbaum, 'Secret Sewers of Vice' at 29 (cited in note 7); cf. Daniel Farber and
Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 Const. Conun. 257, 265-67 (1996) (describing
people's experiences of being treated as untouchables or pariahs, and arguing that the
equal protection clause stands for the principle that government cannot pass legislation
that creates or encourages that sort of treatment).
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Nussbaum's argument that decisionmakers' disgust at
crimes or offenders should be irrelevant to their decisions is disputed by Dan Kahan. 15 Readers will draw their own conclusions, but it seems to me that Nussbaum has the better of this
debate. For example, both discuss a case in which the state refused to turn over to the representatives of a man convicted of
the sexual torture and murder of a woman the items he had used
in the crime and various pornographic literature the state had
seized from him. The court ruled that returning the property
would not be consistent with the public interest (the statutory
standard for dealing with the return of seized property): It would
"offen[ d] basic concepts of decency" because of the connection
between that property and the gruesome crime itself. Kahan argues that only disgust can explain why the court's decision is correct. He contends that the decision cannot be justified on the
grounds of rehabilitation of the convict (he was serving a life
term without parole) or general deterrence (it is unlikely that the
forfeiture of such property adds any marginal deterrence to such
a severe sentence, and it is unclear how deterrence required the
convict to forfeit these particular items, as opposed to money or
other things of equal value). The only sufficient explanation,
Kahan asserts, is the court's disgust at giving back to the criminal
things that "bore the unmistakable aura of his crime," lest "the
state itself [become] complicit in his depravity." (pp. 66-68)
Nussbaum counters that public outrage and incredulity, the
other two emotions (in addition to disgust) which the state specifically claimed would be a likely result of granting the criminal's request, themselves adequately explain the correctness of
the decision; disgust need not be relied upon. The public would
justifiably be both angered and astonished to learn that the
criminal was being rewarded, by the return of his property, "in
just that area where he should be most severely punished," and
would view the act as profoundly disrespectful to the victim.
(pp. 53-54) I would simply add that the sense of outrage Nussbaum posits encompasses core notions of equity and reciprocity
that have long been recognized as fundamental to justice (e.g.,
an eye for an eye), 16 so (contra Kahan) we do not need disgust to
explain why the criminal's punishment must include depriving
him of the very instrumentalities of his crime. Moreover, while
15. Dan M. Kahan, The Progressive Appropriation of Disgust, in Passions at 63-79
(cited in note 3).
16. See Robert C. Solomon, Justice v. Vengeance: On Law and the Satisfaction of
Emotion, in Passions at 123, 124, 137-40 (cited in note 3).
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Kahan is correct to point out that disgust is not the only emotion
that may encourage distancing or excluding the target as an inferior person (as Nussbaum seems to argue) (pp. 51, 54~
indignation often serves to reaffirm social hierarchy1 Nussbaum properly emphasizes the peculiar danger of disgust
because, more so than indignation or other emotions, disgust
"treat[s] the criminal like an insect or a slug, outside of our
moral community." (p. 54)
Different cultures deal differently with the emotions that
crime and punishment generate. Danielle Allen, a professor of
classics, turns to ancient Greek sources as an exercise in comparative sociology (or criminology). 18 Allen suggests a reconception of how modern punishment may deal with the victim's and
the community's anger at crime. Our society is anxious about
punishment: Denying its basis in the retributive emotions of anger and vengeance sounds as false to human nature as Michael
Dukakis famously did during his 1988 presidential campaign debate,19 but admitting it risks tying punishment too closely to
those potentially ugly and unruly emotions. Allen observes that
Athenians in the classical period seem not to have experienced
this anxiety. "The Athenians had no doubts about why they
punished: it was simply because someone was angry at a wrong
and wanted to have that anger dealt with." (p. 194) But they
also viewed crime and punishment, and the anger underlying
both, as a "disease in which everyone was implicated"wrongdoer, victim, and community. (p. 194-95) The object of
punishment was not simply to give vent to the victim's and the
community's anger at the offender, but to restore the communal
peace that the crime had disrupted. (p. 197) The annual festival
17. Kahan, Progressive Appropriation of Disgust at 77-78 n.33 (cited in note 15); see
also Farber and Sherry, 13 Const. Comm. at 270-71 (cited in note 14) (identifying
"[a)nimus and hostility" as improper motivations for government action insofar as they
lead to caste legislation). Note also that fear or anxiety may lead to defensive attribution, by which the decisionmaker distances himself or herself from and blames the person
being judged. See Neal Feigenson, Legal Blame: How Jurors Think and Talk About Accidents 84-85 (American Psychological Association, 2000).
18. Danielle S. Allen, Democratic Dis-ease: Of Anger and the Troubling Nature of
Punishment, in Passions at 191-214 (cited in note 3).
I 9. When asked during a debate with then-Vice President George Bush whether he
would favor the death penalty if his wife, Kitty, were raped and murdered, Dukakis,
"[r)ather than expressing outrage at the very mention of such a brutal crime, ... gave a
detached, emotionless defense of his opposition to capital punishment. The answer was
viewed as so damaging to Mr. Dukakis' campaign that no Democratic presidential nominee since then has opposed the death penalty." Bill Sammon, Liberals See Death Penalty
As Issue, Washington Times (June 14, 2000), <http://www.usembassy.lt/pas/hyperfilel
efs506.htm> (visited May 22, 2001).
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of scapegoating was a way of acknowledging that the anger and
disruption caused by crime was a problem the entire community
shared, to be resolved by communal action. (p. 198) Leading
philosophers have since directed our attention otherwise: Plato
focused on the wrongdoer, not the community, as the sole bearer
of "disease," justifying punishment that excluded the wrongdoer
from the community, (p. 201) and Kant sought to explain retributive punishment without reference to anger at all. (pp. 20103) Hence our present inability to resolve the anger that motivates both crime and our responses to it. Allen does not pursue
specifically how contemporary punishment might make its retributive core more ethically satisfying, but other work on forgiveness and criminal law has begun to do so. 20
As Nussbaum's and Allen's essays show, determining
whether to censure or embrace a particular emotion for purposes of legal decisionmaking is a complex matter. No contributor to The Passions of Law better appreciates how our imperfect
understanding of our emotions ought to complicate the making
and interpreting of emotion-relevant law than William Ian
Miller. 21 Miller closely and colorfully analyzes the Uniform
Code of Military Justice's proscription of "Misbehavior before
the enemy," including running away and other acts of cowardice.
Typical is Miller's psychological exegesis of the following recollection by a Union officer during the Civil War:
I wondered then, and I wonder now equally, at the mystery of
bravery. It seemed to me, as I saw men facing death at Fredericksburg, that they were heroes or cowards in spite of themselves. In the charge I saw one soldier falter repeatedly, bowing as if before a hurricane. He would gather himself
together, gain his place in the ranks, and again drop behind.
Once or twice he fell to his knees, and at last he sank to the
ground, still gripping his musket and bowing his head. I lifted
him to his feet and said, "Coward!" It was cruel, it was
wicked; but I failed to notice his almost agonized effort to
command himself. I repeated the bitter word, "Coward!" His
pale, distorted face flamed. He flung at me, "You lie!" Yet
he didn't move; he couldn't; his legs would not obey him. I
left him there in the mud. Soon after the battle he came to
me with tears in his eyes and said, "Adjutant, pardon me, I

20. See, e.g., Robert D. Enright and Joanna North, eds., Exploring Forgiveness (U.
of Wisconsin Press, 1998), especially the chapters by Walter J. Dickey and David Couper.
21. William Ian Miller, Fear, Weak Legs, and Running Away: A Soldier's Story, in
Passions at 241-64 (cited in note 3).
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couldn't go on; but I'm not a coward." Pardon him! I asked
his forgiveness. (pp. 247-48)

Should this soldier have been subject to court-martial under
what is now the catch-all subsection (5), which punishes soldiers
"guilty of cowardly conduct," if not also the more specific subsection (8), which punishes a soldier who "willfully fails to do his
utmost to encounter, engage, capture, or destroy any enemy
troops"? To warrant prosecution under the Code, cowardly
conduct must be motivated by fear, but how do we know that
another person was moved by fear, when other emotions can
generate fear's prototypical blanching, sweats, or weakness, and
when fearful people can suppress these bodily markers? (pp.
245-46) And if this soldier was not afraid, then how to explain
his weak legs, which would not obey his conscious will? "Without a convincing account of mind and body, emotion and body,
we do not know how to apportion blame as between body and
soul." (p. 248) More broadly, which fear-driven fleeing or failing to attack gets punished when almost all soldiers in all ages
are presumptively, and justifiably, afraid in battle? Miller proceeds to make much good sense of the statute's amalgam of dictates against fearful conduct, but ultimately what sets his contribution apart from most of the others in the book is his
acknowledgment of how difficult it may be to reconcile legal
rules with psychological reality in cases in which our grasp of the
latter is uncertain.
The essays in The Passions of Law indicate the breadth of
emotion-in-law inquiry not simply by addressing such an impressive variety of legal topics but also by implicating so many different ways in which emotions figure in law. At least nine are
examined: (1) the extent to which the law should recognize specific emotions of legal actors by making those emotions explicit
(or strongly implicit) factors in or elements of the relevant legal
claim or defense; 22 (2) how particular emotional reactions to
certain acts shared by (the vast majority of?) members of the
community constitute "the bedrock of many of our moral rules"
22. E.g., Posner, Emotion versus Emotionalism at 313-17 (cited in note 3) (disputing
that a criminal's hate for the victim [as currently identified by "hate crimes"] should warrant more severe punishment than would the same offense if not motivated by hatred);
Nussbaum, 'Secret Sewers of Vice' at 35-38 (cited in note 7) (arguing that a homicide defendant's disgust toward his homosexual victim should not be recognized as a provocation, mitigating his punishment); Austin Sarat, Remorse, Responsibility, and Criminal
Punishment: An Analysis of Popular Culture, in Passions at 168-90 (cited in note 3) (explaining that popular culture considers a criminal's remorse relevant to the degree of
punishment the criminal deserves).
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that are also legal rules; 23 (3) how popular understandings of
particular emotions may contribute to the implicit knowledge
frameworks that lead legislators to craft laws as they do; 24 ( 4)
whether particular emotional reactions by decisionmakers are
reliable guides to what constitutes an instance of an offense25 or
what punishment is deserved; 26 (5) the extent to which good decisionmaking depends on having or being capable of having a
particular emotional state or sufficient "emotional intelligence"
more generally; 27 (6) whether the law should attempt to induce
specific emotions in convicted crirninals;28 (7) how the law
should respond to the presence of specific emotional reactions
on the part of victims of crime or the community in which the
crime is committed (say, anger)-reject, tolerate, or welcome
that emotion (perhaps with conditions) into the decisionrnaking
process;29 (8) relatedly, how legal processes and institutions may
perform a therapeutic role by helping victims cope with their
emotions30 or communities channel anger at wrongdoing into
"building bridges" with transgressors and among themselves;31
and finally (9) how law's authority rna~ depend on an emotional
bond between the law and its subjects. 2 Furthermore, the inclu23. Posner, Emotion versus Emotionalism at 318, 322 (cited in note 3) (enumerating
list of "moral offenses").
24. Cheshire Calhoun, Making Up Emotional People: The Case of Romantic Love,
in Passions at 217-40 (cited in note 3) (contending that homosexuals are excluded from
popular notions of romantic love, which underlies their unequal treatment under laws
such as the Defense of Marriage Act); Miller, Fear, Weak Legs, and Running Away at
241-64 (cited in note 21) (investigating fear-inspired cowardice).
25. E.g., Kahan, Progressive Appropriation of Disgust at 69-71 (cited in note 15)
(arguing that disgust properly signals "hate crime").
26. E.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Moral Epistemology, the Retributive Emotions, and the
'Clumsy Moral Philosophy' of Jesus Christ, in Passions at 149-67 (cited in note 3) (doubting whether resentment, guilt, or any other emotion properly undergirds retribution).
27. E.g., id. (advocating moral humility); Posner, Emotion versus Emotionalism at
322-24 (cited in note 3) (arguing that judges should be capable of indignation and empathy); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Harlan, Holmes, and the Passions of Justice, in Passions at 33062 (cited in note 3) (relating the first John Marshall Harlan's capacity for outrage and
Oliver Wendell Holmes's passion for ideas to their leading decisions).
28. Toni M. Massaro, Show (Some) Emotions, in Passions at 80-120 (cited in note
3) (arguing against the imposition of shaming penalties to induce humiliation); Posner,
Emotion versus Emotionalism at 319-21 (cited in note 3) (largely agreeing, though stating
his position less forcefully).
29. E.g., Solomon, Justice v. Vengeance at 123-48 (cited in note 16) (justifying
vengeance, properly construed, as part of the process of punishment); Allen, Democratic
Dis-ease at 191-214 (cited in note 18).
30. Martha Minow, Institutions and Emotions: Redressing Mass Violence, in Passions at 264-81 (cited in note 3) (discussing truth and reconciliation commissions and
other responses to mass violence).
31. Sarat, Remorse, Responsibility, and Criminal Punishment at 178, 182 (cited in
note 22); Allen, Democratic Dis-ease at 195-98 (cited in note 18).
32. John Dcigh, Emotion and the Authority of Law: Variation on Themes in Ben-
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sion of essays that apply a single emotion to a variety of legal
contexts (e.g., Nussbaum on disgust) as well as those that explore
the multiple emotions relevant to a single legal context (e.g.,
Jeffrie Murphy on retributive emotions and moral humility in
punishment) hints by a kind of synecdoche at the kinds of interactions that a comprehensive, systematic treatment of emotions
in law would survey. By thus suggesting the range and complexity of interrelationships among specific emotions, types of legal
problems, and aspects of legal processes, The Passions of Law
should, at the very least, discourage legal scholars and judges
from overly facile treatments of the subject. 33
The particularity of the respective authors' approaches is
partly at odds with another generally desirable feature of anthologies, which is that the essays should speak to each other or
at least cross paths. Yet the essays here accomplish this to some
extent. For instance, in Part I, "Disgust and Shame," Nussbaum
and Kahan explicitly engage one another on the relevance of decisionmakers' disgust to their judgments, and Toni Massaro
takes on Kahan's advocacy of shaming penalties by arguing,
among other things, that the variability of people's susceptibility
to, experiences of, and behavioral responses to shame are likely
to undermine the goals of shaming. 34 In Part II, "Remorse and
the Desire for Revenge," Jeffrie Murphy, Robert Solomon, and
Danielle Allen each present a different perspective on the extent
to which the retributive emotions supply a valid basis for punishment (and Solomon explicitly refers to Murphy's essay).
Solomon, Allen, and Austin Sarat also sound a theme that resonates with one of Nussbaum's main concerns: how coming to
terms with the emotions that we feel when punishing the guilty
can affect relationships among offender, victim, and community,
and hence the ongoing well-being of the community.35 And in
tham and Austin, in Passions at 285-308 (cited in note 3).
33. Of the sort for which Pillsbury criticizes Judge Hiller Zobel in the Louise
Woodward trial, the famous "Nanny Case." See Pillsbury, Harlan, Holmes, and the Passions of Justice at 354-56 (cited in note 27).
34. Massaro, Show (Some) Emotions at 84-97 (cited in note 28). Massaro also cautions against Kahan's advocacy (implicit in the title of his essay) that liberals "fight disgust with disgust," explaining: "We cannot assume that the release of our suppressed disgust and revulsion toward criminals will inevitably yield more enlightened justice because
we will better contain the excesses of our strong emotions if they are exposed to the light
of public scrutiny than if they go underground and resurface elsewhere." Id at 99.
35. See Nussbaum, 'Secret Sewers of Vice' at 51-52 (cited in note 7) (arguing that
validating disg4_st at offenders tends to treat them as aliens, excludable from the community); Solomon, Justice v. Vengeance at 142-43 (cited in note 16) (claiming that vengeance, properly construed, cares about the relationship between victim, offender, and
avenger); Murphy, Moral Epistemology at 159-60 (cited in note 26) (arguing that moral

456

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol.18:445

Part IV, "The Passion for Justice," Posner disagrees with Kahan
on hate crimes. 36 Kahan contends that disgust inevitably infuses
the law's evaluation of certain crimes and criminals, so liberals
would do well, through hate crime legislation (or other means),
to see that the law reflects their valuations of what sorts of criminals ought to be especially despised (i.e., those who target members of oppressed groups for violence ). 37 Posner believes this
political or ideological component of hate crime laws is precisely
why they should not be allowed, and dismisses the Supreme
Court's ostensibly non-political defense of those laws against
First Amendment challenge as "judicial sophistry." 38
The topics highlighted by the presence of these colloquies
are no less worthy of emphasis than others the editor and/or contributors might have chosen. Of course, any collection of essays
is bound to omit some important subjects. Given Bandes's own
enumeration of the legal contexts that emotion pervades, (p. 2)
readers might also have looked for analyses of the role of emotions in civil (as opposed to criminal) cases39 and in lawyer-client
relations and advocacy (as opposed to legislation and adjudication). Some of those analyses would be of particular interest to
constitutional law scholars. For example, because the reprehensibility of a tort defendant's conduct is central to the reasonablehumility forces those who sit in judgment to face the question whether it is superior
moral character rather than luck or circumstance that has led them to avoid being the
one judged); Sarat, Remorse, Responsibility, and Criminal Punishment at 178, 182 (cited
in note 22) (stating that "[r)emorse builds a bridge between offender and the community
astonished by his deed"); Allen, Democratic Dis-ease at 204-06 (cited in note 18) (arguing
that classical Athenian criminal procedure tried to resolve anger in order to repair the
damage to the community done by the crime).
36. Posner, Emotion versus Emotionalism at 313-17 (cited in note 3). Posner cites
an earlier article by Kahan and Nussbaum as exemplary of the position with which he
disagrees. Id. at 315 n.9. See Dan M. Kahan and Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 269 (1996).
37. Kahan, Progressive Appropriation of Disgust at 69-71 (cited in note 15).
38. Posner, Emotion versus Emotionalism at 316 (cited in note 3) (citing Wisconsin
v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993)). Posner also disagrees with Nussbaum on the legal significance of disgust and with Kahan on the viability of shaming penalties. Id at 319-22.
Also in Part IV, Pillsbury diverges from Nussbaum on the general relationship between
emotion and the kind of public discourse ideally reflected in law, largely because they
look at different ends of the emotion elephant: Nussbaum at particular emotional states
that she argues do (indignation) or do not (disgust) support such discourse, while Pillsbury is concerned with individual variations in emotional traits (which, of course, would
cut against intersubjective agreement of the sort required to support a shared discourse).
Compare Pillsbury, Harlan, Holmes, and the Passions of Justice at 352 (cited in note 27)
with Nussbaum, 'Secret Sewers of Vice' at 26-17 (cited in note 7). Otherwise, the essays
in Parts III ("Love, Forgiveness, and Cowardice") and IV do not join issue with each
other or with essays elsewhere in the book.
39. Minow, Institutions and Emotions at 272-76 (cited in note 30), does address the
supposed therapeutic functions of ADR, drawing on cognitive emotion theory.
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ness of any punitive damage award, 40 an examination of how anger and related emotions bear on perceived reprehensibility
would be germane to the evaluation of punitive damages under
the Due Process Clause. Another worthwhile inquiry could address the relevance of lawyers' emotions and emotional labors
(e.g., the suppression of unpleasant emotions or the reduction of
dissonance among conflicting emotional comrnitmentst 1 to their
clients' right to effective assistance of counsel.42
In addition, while some of the essays provide the sort of detailed legal contextualization which Bandes correctly posits as
essential for understanding the roles that emotions do and ought
to play in legal judgment, (pp. 9, 12-13) others do not achieve the
same specific, practical focus. The essays in Part II on anger,
vengeance, and remorse in criminal law, for instance, plainly
bear on the heated constitutional litigation regarding victim impact statements,43 about which Bandes herself, among others,
has written so well. 44 Yet the essays in this gortion of the book
mention victim impact statements only once.
A more serious limitation of The Passions of Law is its failure to make better use of available interdisciplinary scholarship
on the emotions. Those inclined to take emotions in law seriously need whatever guidance empirical research can offer about
how particular emotions work, what stimuli provoke them, and
what effects they are likely to have on the various processes of
legal judgment, so that they may think most productively about
whether and how the law should respond to those emotions. To
begin with, the introduction might have situated the essays more

40. E.g., BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) (holding punitive damage award 500 times the amount of plaintiffs actual harm to be "grossly excessive" and thus in violation of Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
41. See, e.g., The Role of Emotion in Lawyering (panel presentation by Susan Bandes, Robert Rosen, and Neal Feigenson, Working Group on Law, Culture, and the Humanities, Washington, DC, March 10, 2000) (papers on file with author).
42. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel not violated during capital sentencing phase even though court-appointed lawyer admitted feeling "hopeless" about
saving defendant's life and conducted no investigation into possible mitigating factors).
43. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (holding Eighth Amendment
permits capital juries to hear victim impact evidence in sentencing phase).
44. Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 361 (1996).
. 45. Sarat, Remorse, Responsibility, and Criminal Punishment at 178, 189 n.53 (cited
m note 22). Among the essays lacking in practical focus I would also include Deigh,
Emotion and the Authority of Law (cited in note 32) (which, to be fair, is a work of theoretical jurisprudence which does not purport to apply to specific, practical legal problems).
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firmly in the relevant literatures. During the last decade or so,
for instance, a growing number of articles in law reviews and interdisciplinary journals such as Law and Human Behavior have
drawn on psychology to explore the place of emotion in law. A
brief literature review would help establish this context. 46
The Passions of Law offers much valuable philosophizing
about emotion, some of it by the most distinguished persons in
the field. Not only is philosophical analysis required to determine whether particular emotions ought to figure in legal judgment, but it is hard to imagine useful empirical research on the
emotions without philosophical underpinnings that help to shape
the research hypotheses and the interpretation of their significance. Greater empiricism, however, would help tether philosophical argument to the book's stated practical purposes.
Some of the essays are explicitly well grounded in psychology and other emotion research and theory. For instance, Nussbaum, Massaro, and Calhoun all cite sufficiently for purposes of
their respective arguments to relevant empirical research, and
Massaro and Miller are especially sensitive to the limits of the
knowledge on which they draw. (Solomon's citations are less extensive but he writes with the authority of being himself the author of leading works in the field.t 7 By contrast, Minow, who
writes clearly, albeit briefly, about the psychological effects of
dispute resolution processes, cites to only one source in the field,
a collection of readings, while Posner lists cognitive theorists of
emotion in his first footnote but otherwise refers to only two articles in interdisciplinary (psychology and law) journals. More is
needed. 48 Here are a few ways in which research on the emotions can assist legal scholars and practitioners in dealing with
specific issues raised in the book.
46. It would also have been helpful to include in the introduction or perhaps in an
appendix a brief list of references to leading background literature on emotion research
and theory in general, as well as to other work on important specific psychological and
other questions that the essays in the book necessarily address in a limited fashion if at
all.
47. E.g., Passions (Anchor Press, Doubleday, 1976); A Passion for Justice (AdissonWesley, 1990).
48. Doing better interdisciplinary work by utilizing emotion research and theory
better is not a matter of first nailing down some consensus definition of "emotion" or
agreed-upon theory of how to understand emotions. As Bandes correctly recognizes,
there are no such things, and the essays themselves prove that this lack of foundations in
the source discipline is no insuperable obstacle to useful inquiry into emotions in law.
Introduction at 10-11 (cited in note 6). I agree, however, with Laura Little's argument
that a deeper understanding of emotion theory would illuminate some of the debates in
the present volume. See Little, 86 Cornell L. Rev. at 981-86 (cited in note 4).
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One obvious and important question raised by inquiries into
the proper role of emotion in law concerns the ability of people
to regulate their emotional responses and associated behaviors.
If and to the extent that reflection leads us to want to discourage
the use of certain emotions in legal decisionmaking (as Nussbaum would like to do with disgust, (p. 22) and Posner, (excess)
"emotionalism" (pp. 311, 324)) how can this be done, given that
proscribing emotion in the letter of the law hardly assures its absence in practice? (Consider, for instance, the admonition in
standard civil jury instructions that jurors are "not to be swayed
by sympathy for or prejudice against either party.") Conversely,
can the law "educate" decisionmakers to include desirable emotions in their judgment processes, as Bandes wonders? (p. 14) A
substantial literature on emotional intelligence49 and emotional
control 50 indicates that decisionmakers may, in some circumstances and to some extent, regulate their emotional responses
to the matters before them and the effects of those responses on
their judgments. Research also indicates conditions under which
attempts at emotional regulation may be ineffective or even
backfire, leading to greater reliance on the proscribed feeling. 51
Another way to mitigate decisionmakers' use of unwanted
emotions is to exclude emotion-provoking stimuli. As Posner
recognizes, "[t]he law has an elaborate set of doctrines for fending off dangerous intrusions of emotion into the judicial process . . . . A proper understanding and critique of these rules [of
evidence] might profit greatly from a careful examination of
them in the light cast by the systematic study of the role of emotions in law." (p. 327) This is but part of a broader issue, logically prior to emotional self-regulation, on which emotion research can shed light: How do emotions actually interact with
non-emotional cognitions to produce legal judgments? Apart
from Posner's cogent but incomplete discussion of how empathy
can help counter the availability heuristic, (pp. 323-24) the authors do not make much use of the psychological research and
theory on emotions and social judgment. 52 Readers could better
49. See, e.g., Daniel Goleman, Emotional Intelligence (Bantam Books, 1995); Peter
Salovey and John D. Mayer, Emotional Intelligence, 9 Imagination, Cognition, & Person- •
ality 185 (1990).
50. See generally, e.g., Daniel Wegner and James Pennebaker, eds., Handbook of
Mental Control (Prentice Hall, 1993).
51. See, e.g., Kari Edwards and Tamara S. Bryan, Judgmental Biases Produced by
Instructions to Disregard: The (Paradoxical) Case of Emotional Information, 23 PersonalIty & Soc. Psycho!. Bull. 849 (1997).
52. See, e.g., Joseph P. Forgas, ed., Emotion and Social Judgments (Pergamon
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evaluate Posner's call for judicial empathy, for instance, if they
knew more about empathy's other effects on judgment, including the subjectivity and other biases to which the perspectivetaking inherent in empathy has been shown to lead. 53 Without
drawing on that kind of research, legal scholars can hardly hope
to determine whether and when "emotion in concert with cognition [may] lead[ ] to truer perception and, ultimately, to better
(more accurate, more moral, more just) decisions," as Bandes
believes it does. (p. 7)
Several essays debate whether it is better to bring to the surface and thus confront the emotions that may be driving our decisions than to ignore or sup};?ress them, especially emotions that
are likely to be destructive. " In addition to the work on emotional intelligence and control mentioned above, which would
help legal scholars understand the limits of our abilities to recognize and respond to our emotions, psychological studies of the
health and other effects of individuals' suppression or expression
of emotion 55 could (to the extent these findings are generalizable
from individual to group effects) help the legal community
evaluate the likely consequences of welcoming versus excluding
particular emotions from legal decisionmaking.
Finally, a number of the essays raise the issue of how individual variations in emotional experience and behavior should
affect legal policy and decisionmaking. 56 Massaro supports her
argument on this point with references to psychological work on
shaming, but does not make use of research on emotional state
variations across individuals more generally. And Pillsbury, who

Press, 1991); Joseph P. Forgas, ed., Feeling and Thinking (Cambridge U. Press, 2000).
For references to the literature and analyses of the effects of particular emotions on legal
judgments, see Feigenson, Legal Blame at 74-86 (cited in note 17).
53. See Neal R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analy·
sis, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 1, 46-64 (1997).
54. See Massaro, Show (Some) Emotions at 98-101 (cited in note 28) (Massaro disputes Kahan's contention that it is better for the law to express disgust with a criminal
than to suppress it); Allen, Democratic Dis-ease at 205-06 (cited in note 18) (arguing that
community may benefit by acknowledging and attempting to resolve the anger behind
the urge to punish).
55. See, e.g., James Pennebaker, Confession, Inhibition, and Disease, in Leonard
Berkowitz, ed., 22 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 211 (1989); Keith J.
Petrie, Roger J. Booth, and James W. Pennebaker, The Immunological Effects of
Thought Suppression, 75 J. Personality & Soc. Psycho!. 1264 (1998).
56. See Bandes, Introduction at 13 (cited in note 6) (raising the issue); Massaro,
Show (Some) Emotions at 82-89 (cited in note 28) (arguing that individual variations in
experience of and response to shame undermine validity of shaming penal~ies); ~i!Isbury,
Harlan, Holmes, and the Passions of Justice at 334-49 (cited m note 27) (discussmg effect
of judges' emotional traits on their decisionmaking).
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alone in the anthology analyzes the effect of individual differences in emotional traits on legal decisionmaking, does not cite
to any of the psychology literature on this subject. 57 A more
thorough consideration of what psychology and other empirical
disciplines have learned about this and other subjects would help
Pillsbury (and other legal scholars) to achieve not only his stated
goal of overcoming "the conceptual and terminologic inadequacy of most current discussions of emotion in law," (p. 331)
but also the broader Realist aim, which Pillsbury endorses, (p.
331 n.4) of attuning law to the psychological reality of emotion.
The Passions of Law is an excellent introduction to a topic
that is bound to grow in importance. The contributors present
careful and sophisticated investigations into a variety of interactions between emotions and legal issues. Their work should enhance interest in and respect for interdisciplinary work in this
field. As legal practice and discourse increasingly embrace
popular forms of communication, including emotion-laden visual
displays of all kinds, the impact of emotions on legal judgments
will only become more compelling and more in need of critical
analysis. Further inquiries in the directions explored in this
book, making even better use of emotion research and theory in
other disciplines, would help to answer this need.

57. For a brief introduction to a range of views on the subject, see Ekman and
Davidson, eds., The Nature of Emotion at 321-43 (cited in note 11).

